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Research Proposal 
Complexity beyond Compatibility: The Impact of Islamism on Local Democracy 
In South Sulawesi Province of Indonesia 
 
In recent studies on Islam and politics, no other theme has received as much scholarly 
attention as the discourse of ‘compatibility between Islam and democracy.’ This theme has 
generated a lengthy debate in regard to whether Islam is compatible with democracy or not, and 
has in general polarized the scholarship into two contesting streams. The first is what can be 
called ‘the incompatibility school,’ consisting scholars who perceive Islam and democracy as 
two different and opposing ideas, and thus their arguments indicate skepticism of the possibility 
of the two ideas to converge (Huntington, 1993, 1996; Lewis, 1990, 1993, 2002; Kedouri, 1992). 
The second is that can be called as ‘the compatibility school’ that argues for a possibility of 
coexistence between Islam and democracy in Muslim societies. In relatively recent scholarly 
works, the proponents of this school have claimed and demonstrated that Islam contains many 
elements that make it able to be compatible and to support democracy (Esposito & Voll, 1996; 
Esposito, 2002; Wright, 2005; Lahoud, 2005; Eickelman & Piscatori, 2004; Khatab & Bouma, 
2007; Esposito & Mogahed, 2008; Feldman, 2008; Khan, 2005, 2009).  
As it will be shown in detail in the literature review, the scholarly works of the two 
schools largely employ examinations on normative factors such as religious doctrine and values, 
and very few use empirical analysis that observes the Muslims’ actual perception and attitude 
toward democracy.  In analyzing the relationship between Islam and democracy, most studies in 
both schools merely focus their attention on formal politics and macro issues, and their findings 
are usually presented in a generalization at state level. As the result, the scholarship only offers a 
general and simplistic explanation of whether Islam and democracy are compatible or not. By 
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bringing the inquiry to the local level and employing a close observation, this study is intended 
to reveal that there is a complexity in the relationship between Islam and democracy that cannot 
be simply described by a single character of either compatibility or incompatibility. 
Given the fact that Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world, the 
country’s commitment to embrace democracy contributes an interesting case into the debate of 
Islam-democracy relationship. Indonesian case does not only show that democracy can exist in a 
Muslim society, but also display that the two ideas interact and affect one another in multiple 
ways. Various studies have suggested that Islamic actors have played an influential role in the 
country’s transition toward democracy (for instance Barton & Fealy, 1996; Hefner, 2000; 
Baswedan, 2004). In the time of political crisis in 1998, Islamic figures and institutions worked 
hand-in-hand with other social elements in a campaign to end Suharto’s authoritarian regime and 
to establish a new and democratic political system. In the post-Suharto era, these Islamic forces 
continue to take part in the country’s socio-political arena within the framework of democracy. 
Since 1998, dozens of Islamic parties have been established and are actively participating in 
elections and other political occasions, and some of them have successfully gained power in the 
ruling government at national and local level. In addition, several Islamic figures have also held 
various prominent governmentl positions like ministers, chair of national legislature, and even 
the country’s head of state. However, it would be simplistic to assume that the activities of 
Islamic forces in Indonesia are always in favor of democracy. In fact, post-Suharto Indonesia 
also witnessed some incidents of religious violence in which certain Islamic groups were deeply 
implicated (Sidel, 2006). This indicates that Indonesian Muslims’ attitude toward democracy is 
complicated. 
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Moreover, post-authoritarian Indonesia also witnesses an increasing trend of Islamism in 
the forms of Islamist politics and Islamization. This trend can be seen in the growing popularity 
of religious symbols and practices among the Muslims in the public sphere, indicating that more 
and more Indonesian Muslims have turned to religious norms and values, not only in personal 
life, but also in social and political ones. Another example is that before the 1990s ordinary 
Indonesians rarely wore Islamic attire in public. Only ulamas (religious clerics) and religious 
professionals such as the Imam of mosque
1
 regularly did so. But in the last two decades it is 
more and more common for Muslims to wear and become more confident in public with Islamic 
attires. Interestingly, such trend of Islamism is not dominated by Muslim males. Participation by 
Muslim females is also obvious as more women wear veils or religious headscarves in public and 
more women enter public debates on religious issues (for discussions about Islamization among 
Indonesian Muslim females, see Brenner, 2005; and Blackburn, 2008). Although such increasing 
popularity of Islamic attire does not necessary indicate a turn to a religious orthodoxy, it 
represents an apparent Islamism among Indonesian Muslims. 
More strikingly, the trend of Islamism does not only occur in fashion and religious 
practices, but also in Muslims political life. In the post-Suharto era, religious rhetoric and Islamic 
agenda has also become more openly expressed in the political arenas. Although the idea of 
establishing an Islamic state has no longer been the main objective of Indonesian political Islam, 
Islamism in politics is apparent in the increasing number of Muslim organizations and local 
governments that adopt shari’a. Since the decentralization program introduced in 1999, more 
than 50 districts across the country have implemented shari’a bylaws in various policies (for 
Shari’a implementation by local governments see Bush, 2008; Buehler, 2008). 
                                                          
1
 In Muslim communities in Indonesia, it is common that a village has at least one mosque in which regular prays 
are organized and led by an Imam who is elected by the village citizens but must be officially approved by the 
government.  
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In Indonesian province of South Sulawesi, where this study will take place, the trend of 
Islamism can even be traced to the period before the state’s independence. Although the 
introduction of Islam in South Sulawesi in the 17
th
 century can be regarded relatively late in 
comparison to many other parts of the archipelago, this region has played a significant role in the 
history of Islam in Indonesia. When the Dutch attempted to gain control over trade and natural 
resources in this area which led to the Makassar War (1660-1970), Islam had been regarded as a 
unifying identity by the local people in the face of their European enemy (Mattulada, 1976: 52). 
The Bugis and the Makasaresse of South Sulawesi are two ethnic groups that have been 
commonly associated with their Islamic identity as they are predominantly Muslim and have 
developed Islamic-influenced culture since the Islam was introduced in the region (Ricklefs, 
2001: 67). In the modern state era, this region witnessed an Islamic rebellion of the Darul 
Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) led by Kahar Muzakkar who aimed to separate the region 
from the state of Indonesia and establish an Islamic state. This movement gained a large popular 
support from the local people and lasted for over a decade (for further study of this rebellion, see 
Harvey, 1974). In the post Suharto era, Islamism in this region was indicated by the adoption of 
shari’a by laws by various local governments. As Buehler recorded that this region has a second 
largest number of districts that adopt shari’a regulation. It is only topped by Aceh, which adopt 
shari’a in the entire province under its special autonomy status (Buehler, 2008: 256-7). 
While the above depiction of South Sulawesi indicates a strong Islamism, the region also 
displays some interesting features that are crucial in examining Islam-democracy relationship. 
Unlike Aceh and other shari’a provinces that fully composed by Muslim-majority districts, South 
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Sulawesi has two Christian-majority districts: Toraja and North Toraja
2
. These two districts are 
bordered by Muslim-majority districts, making social relations between religious groups are 
more visible to analyze. When several ethno-religious violence erupted in many parts of the 
archipelago in the early years of post-Suharto era, South Sulawesi remained relatively peaceful 
and even became a sanctuary for refugees and conflict victims from Maluku and Central 
Sulawesi. In terms of culture, the people of South Sulawesi still maintain various non-Islamic 
local traditions that are incorporated or at least coexistent with Islamic practices. One of such 
traditions is the existence of the Bugis ‘bissu,’ transgender persons who can bestow blessings for 
the Bugis for various purposes including performing Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca
3
. These 
features are arguably important in analyzing the presence of tolerance and pluralism within and 
between religious communities. 
While it is apparent that Islam continues to play role in shaping the socio-political 
attitudes of Muslims, it is still relatively unclear how Islamism would react to and affect the 
process of democratization. The majority of studies on Islam-democracy relationship largely 
employ doctrinal analysis on the discussion of whether Islam is compatible with democracy, 
focusing analysis on what elements of Islam, textually and historically, are compatible and can 
coexist with the principle of democracy. This scholarship largely places Islam in a static position 
under the incoming wave of democratization, and tends to overlook that Islam is ideologically 
and empirically dynamic and there is also a growing trend of Islamism in many Muslim 
communities. If the two processes, democratization and Islamism, can take place in one polity, 
how do they interact one another? To what extent will they engage peacefully or be in conflict? 
                                                          
2
 Religious affiliation in Indonesia is often linked with the ethnic identity. For instance, the Bugis and the 
Makasarese of South Sulawesi are considered predominantly Muslim, while the Torajans who are mostly found in 
the districts of Toraja  and North Toraja are predominantly Protestant. 
3
 While conservative Islam rejects the existence of transgender, the Bugis of South Sulawesi acknowledge five 
genders: male, female, the calabai, the calalai, and the bissu (For a study about the Bissu see Andaya, 2000). 
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Although a few studies have investigated the role of Islam and how democratic Islamic forces 
participate in the process of democratization (for instance Hefner, 2000; Soguk, 2010), there is 
still inadequate explanation as to how Islamism would affect the process of democratization in 
the post-Suharto era, and how the Muslims’ political behavior toward democracy would be. 
Moreover, the scholarship tends to rely on overly traditional conception of politics in which 
primary focus is formal and institutionalized structures such as political parties, legislature and 
elections. While the nature and the extent of relationship between Islam and democracy may 
vary from area to area within a country, most studies on the scholarship merely focus their 
attention on issues at national-wide level. Consequently, there is a dearth of exploration on how 
religious and democratic values interact in everyday activities of the Muslim commoners at local 
level. In light of these shortcomings, I propose to research the impact of Islamism on democracy 
at local level, specifically in the province of South Sulawesi. 
 
Literature Review 
Compatibility vs. Incompatibility 
In the discussion of the relationship between Islam and democracy, the scholarship has 
been dominated by a conceptual debate between two streams: the school of incompatibility and 
the school of compatibility. The former basically rejects and criticizes the notion of compatibility 
between Islam and democracy, while the latter is characterized by an optimistic view on the 
compatibility between the two ideas. Of these two schools, the conceptualization of my study 
will be developed based on the latter school as the case of Indonesia has suggested that the 
coexistence between Islam and democracy is possible. However, it is still important to explore 
the conceptual basis of the two competing schools. 
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The school of incompatibility consists of prominent political theorists and historians, 
including Samuel Huntington (1993; 1996), Bernard Lewis (1990; 1993; 2002) and Elie 
Kedourie (1992), who perceive Islam and democracy as two ideas that contradict one another, 
and thus cannot coexist in one polity. These scholars basically perceive democracy as a 
distinctively Western idea that is therefore impossible to apply to an Islamic community because, 
they argue, it will be in conflict with the Muslims’ theological basis. Although most scholars in 
this school do not specifically mention democracy as an idea that incompatible with Islam, their 
arguments indicate that Islam as a religion and civilization would reject any Western idea 
including liberal democracy. 
For instance, Samuel Huntington (1993; 1996), with his famous thesis Clash of 
Civilizations, suggested that the basis for post-Cold War world would be characterized by more 
conflicts on cultural lines between major civilizations including that between the West and Islam. 
He argues that the failure of democracy in the Muslim world is at least partly due to the nature of 
Islamic culture and society that is inhospitable to Western democracy, and as the influence of 
religion has been so pervasive in the Muslims’ life the attempts to introduce democracy to their 
society are likely to be more difficult (Huntington, 1996: 111-2). He further argues that “So long 
as Islam remains Islam (which it will) and the West remains the West (which is more dubious), 
this fundamental conflict between two great civilizations and ways of life will continue to define 
their relations in the future” (1996: 211-2). Although he acknowledges that Islam can be divided 
into three sub-cultural divisions - Arab, Turkic, and Malay (1993: 24) - his works tend to see 
Islam in a single character. He believes that all Muslims, even those who are moderate, are likely 
to be hostile to any Western idea. He argues that “[t]he underlying problem for the West is not 
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Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the 
superiority of their culture” (1996: 114).  
Bernard Lewis, a prominent historian, asserts the significance of the divine law shari’a as 
the major obstacle for Muslims to adopt democracy. He argues that because shari’a regulates all 
aspects of a Muslim’s life, including his political life, it is difficult to imagine that Muslims 
would be able to develop any aspect of life outside religious regulation and jurisdiction (Lewis, 
2002: 100). Elie Kedourie (1992) makes a similar argument by criticizing the transnational form 
of the Muslims community called the Umma
4
. Kadourie argues that all Muslims regardless their 
geographical and political location consider themselves having a single community or Umma, 
which makes the concept of nation-state alien to Muslim politics and cannot be institutionalized 
in the Muslim community because it is antagonistic to the pervasive concept of the Umma. As 
the concept of nation-state is crucial for democracy, the introduction of democracy in Islamic 
community would be essentially difficult (1992: 1-2). 
The proponents of the incompatibility school are arguably building their arguments 
largely on doctrinal analysis, in which they found that some Islamic teachings contradict with 
liberal democratic principles. However, they seem to exaggerate the non-democratic feature of 
Islamic teachings and overlook the fact that some aspects in Islam are democratic or at least 
compatible with democracy. The arguments of the incompatibility school are also supported by 
political reality of their times that most of Muslim countries were ruled by authoritarian regimes. 
Again, the validity of such argument is later challenged by the recent phenomena of 
democratization in Indonesia.  
                                                          
4
 The Umma is a community or solidarity group that is built on the basis of Islamic faith and overarches ethnic and 
national solidarity. 
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The school of compatibility contends that Muslims are able to adopt democracy in their 
social and political life. Hence, democratic systems in Islamic communities are possible. 
Compared to the former school, the compatibility school consists of relatively new scholars 
whose works mostly emerged after the events of 9/11, partly as a response to the West’s 
criticism of Islam. In general, these scholars advocate an approach that sees the Islamic world in 
a broad perspective rather than a monolithic realm. While they do not deny the tensions that may 
have existed between Western ideas and Islamic values, they basically argue that Islam and 
democracy are not antithetical. In terms of methodology, scholarly works in this school vary 
from using historical observation to employing textual and doctrinal analysis. 
Many of the proponents of this school have warned against monolithic characterization of 
Islam and the Muslim world (Esposito, 2002; Eickelman & Piscatori, 2004; Khan, 2005; 
Esposito & Mogahed, 2008). They argue that Islam has a vast variety of socio-cultural characters 
which would be difficult to be simplified in one single category. For instance, Eickelman and 
Piscatori demonstrate that millions of Muslims do not live under theocratic regimes. Rather they 
live in more or less democratic, semi-democratic or transitionally democratic societies such as in 
India, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Turkey. Therefore, it is still early to call many of this Muslim 
societies as truly democratic or truly Islamic (Eickelman & Piscatori, 2004). In this regard, one 
should consider and account for the diversity of the contemporary as well as historical 
experience of Islamic world before making a generalization that Islam is antithetical to 
democracy. Although it is also true that many Muslim-majority countries are still ruled by 
dictatorial or authoritarian regimes, this fact is not sufficient to establish a causal link between 
Islam and an absence of democracy. 
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Scholars in the compatibility school also demonstrate that Islam has many social and 
political resources to accommodate a successful democratic community (Esposito & Voll, 1996; 
Esposito, 2002; Wright, 2005; Lahoud, 2005; Khatab & Bouma, 2007; Feldman, 2008; Khan, 
2009). In doing so, they refer to specific terms in Islamic teachings that are consistent with a 
democratic system of governance. Muqtedar Khan points out the terms of shura (consultation) 
and ijma (consensus) as examples. He argues that these religious concepts can be a legitimating 
source for Muslim version of democracy. For instance, the idea of shura dictates to organize 
political life around the consultative making body that is a critical instrument in democratic 
political system. On the other hand, ijma refers to community consensus, which can be used to 
support modern democratic institutions such as parliaments and national assembly (Khan, 2009). 
In the Islamic world, some Muslim societies also show abilities to develop local 
democracy-friendly concepts that are not necessary derived from Islamic teachings and 
traditions. The examples of such local concepts are explored by the work of Nevzat Soguk 
(2010). By pointing out the democratization process in Turkey and Indonesia, Soguk shows that 
distinctive cultural and historical factors such as vast diversity of local culture that creates 
ideological Pancasila in Indonesia and the development of secularist Kemalism in Turkey have 
determined the moderate feature of Islam and prevented the creation of fundamentalist Islamic 
state in the two Muslim countries. As a result, Islam in Turkey and Indonesia is considered more 
plural and tolerant toward external ideas including Western democracy, but at the same time it 
also functioning as a filter for the unintended excess of the incoming waves of globalization 
(Soguk, 2010). 
In the case of Indonesia, many scholars have expressed their views in the line of the 
compatibility school. In general, they focus on the instrumental role of Islamic forces in the 
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country’s democratization by demonstrating the participation of Muslim figures and Islamic 
institutions in political reform and the ongoing democratization (Hefner, 2000; Mujani, 2004; 
Soguk, 2010). They basically argue that Islamic forces in Indonesia possess the spirit of 
pluralism and tolerance that is crucial for democracy. For instance, Robert Hefner (2000) 
portrays Indonesian Muslim leaders and intellectuals such as Abdurrahman Wahid, Amin Rais, 
and Nurcholish Madjid, and Islamic organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Indonesian 
Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI) as leading actors that have played pivotal roles in the 
country’s democratization. Regarding such democratic Islam, he proposes the term “civil Islam” 
referring to Indonesian Muslims who perceive Islam as a part of public life but without a 
necessity to manifest it as a state. Praising them as Muslim democrats, he argues “Muslim 
democrats ... tend to be more civil democratic or Tocquevillian than they are (Atlantic
5
) in spirit. 
They deny the need for an Islamic state. But they insist that society involve more than 
autonomous individuals, and democracy more than markets and the state” (Hefner, 2000: 13). 
Taking the case of Indonesia into account, one would argue that the debate on Islam-
democracy relationship has been settled in favor of the compatibility school. However, the 
discourse is still far from comprehensively revealing the nature of the relationship between Islam 
and democracy due to limitations in the existing scholarship. The following are some gaps of the 
scholarship that my study is intended to fill in: 
1. While the discussions on Islam-democracy relations and the current political reality have 
suggested that Islam can coexist with democracy, at least in some Muslim countries, it is 
still unclear how the two ideas interact in one polity. This suggests that there is a need to 
move a step further from the compatibility discussion. As democratization process in 
                                                          
5
 Hefner (2000) uses the term “Atlantic” in referring to North American and Western European democracies. 
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Muslim countries is shadowed by the trend of Islamism, Understanding how Islamism 
affects democracy becomes more urgent. 
2. Most studies in the scholarship rely on doctrinal and textual analysis in examining Islam-
democracy compatibility. Although this mode of analysis is effective in finding factors of 
either compatibility or incompatibility between the two ideas, it tends to overlook the 
actual socio-political behavior of Muslims, which is also crucial in the discussion. Few 
studies such as that of Hefner (2000) and Mujani (2004) have used empirical analysis in 
their investigation, but those studies possess the following limitations. 
3.  Studies in the scholarship largely focus their attention on macro politics issues using 
materialist conception of politics. Their analyses are limited to major political events 
such as elections, and to major actors such as political parties, prominent figures, etc. As 
the result, the political behavior of non-elite Muslims in non-electoral activities remains 
unexplored. Therefore, my study is designed to target ordinary Muslims in their daily 
activities. 
4. Most studies on Islam-democracy compatibility, and even on political Islam in general, 
adopt a broad framework of analysis, namely the national level, and thus tend to make 
overgeneralization over difference and variation that may occur at local or regional level. 
While the notion that Islam is not monolithic has been largely accepted, the variation of 
Islam-democracy relationships at sub- national levels remains ignored. Studies of Buehler 
(2008) and Bush (2008) can be taken as an exception as they observe shari’a by laws in 
various districts in Indonesia, but again they merely focus their examination on major 
political actors and events. 
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Islamism, Islamist Politics and Islamization 
While the majority of the recent studies on discourse of Islam-democracy relationship 
demonstrate an optimistic view of compatibility, literature on Islamism largely indicates the 
opposite way. This is partly caused by the use of the narrow definition of Islamism that basically 
associates Islamism with religious-political movements that aim for the establishment of Islamic 
state or an Islamic order of governance. In contrast to such narrow conception, this study 
partially suggests Islamism, like Islam, should not be positioned in a fixed-monolithic character 
in the context of how it interacts with democracy. Therefore, the definition of Islamism should 
be expanded to cover broad aspects of Muslims’ socio-political life.  
In this study, three specific terms: Islamism, Islamist politics, and Islamization, will be 
operationalized in referring to the increasing religious sentiment in Muslims’ social and political 
life. These terms are commonly found in discussion of political Islam, but they are often used 
interchangeably despite the fact that they have different meanings. For instance, Peter R. Demant 
in his study Islam vs. Islamism (2006) does not necessary differentiate the terms of Islamism and 
Islamization, and uses them to refer radical Islamic movements vis-a-vis Islam as both religious 
and civilizational entity. My study, in contrast, employs the three terms in different meanings 
and use. It can be argued that Islamism is a more general term and can be divided into two modes 
of operation: Islamist politics and Islamization. Islamism spans from peaceful activities in which 
Muslims merely asserts their religious identity in their personal and social lives to a religious 
movement that espouses fundamentalism and violence such as the Taliban group in Afghanistan. 
In other words, it can be manifested in the political sphere as “Islamist politics” or in broad 
activities of the Muslims in social sphere as “Islamization.” I share this classification with Salwa 
Ismail who argues: 
Agussalim Burhanuddin 
 
14 
 
… ‘Islamism’ is used to encompass both Islamist politics and the process of re-
Islamization. ‘Islamist politics’ … refers to the activities of organizations and 
movements that agitate in the public sphere while deploying signs and symbols 
from Islamic traditions. It entails political ideology articulating the idea of the 
necessity of establishing an Islamic government, understood as a government 
which implements the Shari’a (Islamic law). ‘Islamization’ or re-Islamization 
signifies a drive to Islamize the social sphere. It involves a process whereby 
various domains of social life are invested with signs and symbols associated 
with Islamic cultural traditions (2004: 616). 
 
The term Islamist politics refers to political practices of Muslims that have as their goal 
the establishment of an Islamic political order. This does not imply that the enactment of an 
Islamic state is always the main objective of political Islam. Rather, the Islamic political order in 
this study can be defined as the local political system that is governed according to shari’a. The 
term Islamization, on the other hand, can be defined as a process that leads a society to be 
Muslim or Islamic. As the study will be conducted in Muslim-majority areas, the term 
Islamization is not used to refer to religious conversion into Islam. Rather, it only refers to the 
increasing use of Islamic symbols and rhetoric in the Muslim social life. In terms of actor, the 
adherents of Islamist politics are often called Islamists, while Islamization can be conducted by 
any Muslim without a necessity to call him/her as Islamist. The relationship between the three 
terms can be seen in the following figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Islamism 
Islamist Politics Islamization 
Social sphere political sphere 
Figure 1. The relationship between Islamism, Islamist politics and Islamization 
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To define what Islamism is, I use a definition developed by the International Crisis Group 
that perceives Islamism synonymous with “Islamic activism’. In this regard, Islamism can be 
defined as “[an] active assertion or promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws, or policies that are 
held to be Islamic in character” (International Crisis Group, 2005). However, it is important to 
note that the term Islamism used in this study is not restricted to the ‘classical’ view on political 
Islam that perceives Islamism merely as a political project seeking to capture state power. An 
example for such classical view is the study by Oliver Roy that focuses attention only on 
politico-religious movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Algerian FIS whose he 
argues that the establishment of Islamic state is their main objective (Roy, 1994). This narrow 
definition cannot be used as the establishment of Islamic state is inapplicable at local politics. 
Islamism is not even limited to religious movements that pursue specific Islamic political order 
as Peter Mandaville categorizes it as a form of Muslim politics that advocates shari’a-based 
political system (2007: 57). In this study, Mandaville’s conception of Islamism would fit more 
with the term of Islamist politics, the political dimension of Islamism. 
In the discourse of political Islam, the term Islamism is commonly associated with the 
works of two French scholars: Oliver Roy and Gilles Kepel. Oliver Roy in the Failure of 
Political Islam observes the development of modern Islamic religious movements that he defines 
as Islamism. Referring to the various Islamic political movements such as the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan, and Algeria’s FIS, he argues that political actions 
of the Islamists had failed as they did not result in the establishment of Islamic states or of 
Islamic societies. Rather, they appeared to create a secular space or a return to traditional 
segmentation (Roy, 1994).  Gilles Kepel in an essay “Islamism Reconsidered” shares a similar 
argument, pointing out that Islam today will have lack of Islamic alternatives, and will lead 
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toward greater secularization (Kepel, 2000). He argues, “[P]aradoxically, the Islamist movement 
may have generated the conditions for its own obsolescence (Kepel, 2000: 26). 
While the works of Roy and Kepel can be seen as pioneers in discourse of Islamism, they 
display some limitations. First, they use a narrow concept of Islamism by referring only to 
religious movements that seek to capture state power, in this regard to establish an Islamic state. 
In reality, many Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood that Roy analyzes, also 
operate at societal level in order to Islamize the society. According to Mandaville, the operations 
of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jama’at-i-Islami shifted from social to a more conventional 
politics when the state began interfering and oppressing their activities (2007: 345). Second, 
Roy’s and Kepel’s predictions that in the future Islamism will be domesticated and less 
politicized seem to be disproved by the current reality. What actually happens today is that 
Islamism becomes intensified in both social and political spheres. Islamization and Islamist 
politics have shown similar progress in many Muslim societies. 
In the case of Indonesia, some studies on Islamism have been produced in the post-
Suharto era. However, most of these studies focus their investigation on the militant and radical 
character of particular Islamist groups, and in many cases do not refer to the activities of these 
groups as Islamism nor elaborate their relations to democratization. For instance, Zachary Abuza 
investigates the radical nature of some Islamic groups in Indonesia such as the Jemaah Islamiyah 
(JI), the Laskar Jihad, and the Islam Defender Front (FPI), and attempts to find their links with 
the global network of Islamic fundamentalism (2007). John Sidel in his influential work Riots, 
Pogroms, Jihad, uses a historical and sociological approach to identify particular social 
conditions that shape the pattern of religious violence in Indonesia, in which Islamic group 
heavily participated. He argues that in a region where political and religious identity are closely 
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linked, violence would be likely to occur as a means of determining the relative limits of political 
power among competing groups (Sidel, 2006). As many studies on Islamism in Indonesia simply 
focus on radical/violent dimension of Islamic groups, the perception that Islamism is always 
inimical to democracy has become widely accepted. My study is partly intended to contest such 
perception by examining the character of Indonesia’s Islamism in a balance and comprehensive 
observation. 
A few recent studies have specially investigated Indonesia’s Islamism by using the term 
and relating it with the current process of democratization. However, these studies, again display 
some limitations that have been discussed earlier: focusing on formal politics issues and in a 
generalization of a national wide scope. For instance, Bernhard Platzdasch in Islamism in 
Indonesia focuses his observation only on Islamist politics, more particularly the political 
strategies chosen by Islamist parties in post-Suharto Indonesia (Platzdasch, 2009). Masdar 
Hilmy’s Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia is arguably a more recent and comprehensive 
work in the discourse, but his attempt to observe the relations between Islamism and democracy 
is limited to several formal organizations at national level, namely the Justice Prosperous Party 
(PKS) and the Hizbut Tharir (Hilmy, 2010). To address such limitations, my study is designed to 
employ a broader scope of Islamism by including Islamist politics and Islamization, and by 
taking Islamism activities to local level and on daily basis as the focus of analysis. 
 
Democracy 
Because the term of democracy is a broad and an essentially contested concept, it is 
important to clarify its meaning and definition that are used in this study. I argue that democracy 
can be viewed and measured as ‘procedures’ and as ‘principle’. As procedures, democracy can 
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be seen as a combination of political events or institutions such as free elections, elected 
representatives, and political organizations, which function to increase people’s access to and 
influence on government. Many literatures have discussed democracy in a form of 
procedural/institutional. For instance, Joseph A. Schumpeter defines democracy as “the 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (1947: 69). This 
definition is elaborated further by Robert Dahl (1991) by describing democracy as the form of 
government that meets the following criteria: 
1. Free and periodic competition between at least two candidates occurs for all effective 
decision making positions.  
2. A high degree of political participation in the elections of leaders exists. 
3. There are guarantees of human rights and civil liberties, such as freedom of 
expression, freedom of press, freedom to join and form political parties, etc. 
4. Leaders are held accountable to the public as long as they hold office. 
These definitions emphasizes the role of particular procedures namely elections and political 
institutions namely governments and institutions as critical instruments for democracy. By these 
definitions, democracy as procedure in this study will be called as ‘procedural democracy’ or 
‘institutional democracy’. 
As norms, democracy is a system that consists of several values; namely liberty, equality, 
tolerance, and respect for the laws. Because of its emphasis on principles rather than procedures, 
this kind of democracy is also known as ‘principle democracy.’ These principles have been 
essentially important to be found in a democratic society since the ancient times. For instance, 
Aristotle argues that liberty is essential to the idea of democracy and has two criteria: (1) “ruling 
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and being ruled in turn”, and (2)”living as one chooses.” He further argues that liberty and 
equality are inextricably linked for democrats as the latter is the moral and practical basis for the 
former (Aristotle in Held, 1987: 19). Although liberty is essential for democracy, it is restrained 
by the principles of tolerance and respect for the laws. According to Pericles, Athenian 
democracy is based on rules and laws that are established on the basis of public-spiritness, where 
private life must be subordinated to public affairs (Pericles in Held, 1987: 17). Private life 
subordination to public affairs, in this regard, can be understood as the importance of tolerance 
that limits one’s freedom in a framework of democracy. 
My study will employ the concept of democracy both as procedures and as norms, as the 
conceptual framework in analyzing the impact of Islamism on democracy in South Sulawesi of 
Indonesia. However, this study will focus more in examining principle democracy than 
procedural democracy. To some extent, observation will also include procedural democracy, 
namely local elections and political parties, but they will be used occasionally as additional 
instruments for analyzing the impact of Islamism on principle democracy. The large part of this 
study will examine the extent of Islamism that may pose impact on the principles of democracy: 
civil liberty, tolerance, and respect for laws. Examination on civil liberty in this study will focus 
on freedom of religion and freedom of expression, as they are elements of liberty that are more 
vulnerable to Islamism. On the tolerance, this study will assess the extent of tolerance and 
pluralism of the Islamists and ordinary Muslims toward; (1) non-muslims, (2) the adherents of 
other Islam groups, including Muslim minorities, (3) other sex group, more particularly women. 
The principle of respect for laws is closely related to the two other democratic principles. In this 
regard, the study will seek the extent of Muslims’ respect for laws when they are engaging with 
other group’s interests and issues that are controversial in terms of Islamic teachings. 
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In addition to the above basic principles of democracy, the idea of ‘social capital’ will 
also be included as one of working concepts in analyzing the trend of Islamism in South 
Sulawesi. This concept is developed by Robert Putnam who refers it to “features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating coordinated actions” (1993: 167). Social capital, according to Putnam, is an important 
element of modern society that ‘makes democracy works’ (1993). In this study, this concept will 
be used in analyzing the recent popular trend of religious gathering in Muslim communities and 
to see the extent of civic association that may be espoused by that trend. Hefner’s study (2000) 
also uses social capital as his conceptual basis for analyzing of what he claims as ‘civil Islam,’ 
but he focuses his attention on prominent Muslims figures and organizations that operate in 
formal politics at national level. In contrast, my study will seek to reveal social capital in non-
formal association of ordinary Muslims at the local level. 
By operationalizing these concepts, this study is intended to reveal the extents to which 
Islamism may play role as an obstacle or an impetus for enhancing democracy in South 
Sulawesi. 
 
The Purpose of the Study 
As it can be seen in the previous section, there are various gaps and limitations in the 
existing studies on political Islam. In order to fix those shortcomings, this research project on 
Indonesian Islam is aimed to accomplish two objectives: (1) to develop a more comprehensive 
methodological framework in measuring the relationship between Islamism and democracy by 
using three levels of observation: institutional, societal, and individual; and (2) to examine the 
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impact of Islamism on democracy at local level, namely in South Sulawesi province of 
Indonesia. 
The central question of this study is: In what ways does Islamism affect democracy in 
South Sulawesi? This question is then operationalized into the three levels of observation: (1) 
institutional, (2) societal, and (3) individual, in which its formulation is intended to cover 
comprehensively all visible extents to which Islamism affects the Muslims’ socio-political 
perception and attitude toward democracy in South Sulawesi. 
Level of analysis Case study: Type of Islamism 
Institutional The implementation of shari’a 
regulations 
Islamist politics 
Societal Pengajian (religious 
gathering) 
Islamization 
Individual Muslim’s personal behavior 
toward democracy 
Islamization 
 
 
Table 1. The three levels of analysis 
 
In the institutional level, the study will focus analysis on formal institution that Islamism 
may operate. In this study, the chosen formal institution for a case study is local government at 
district level in South Sulawesi, in which Islamism is manifested in the implementation of shari’a 
regulations. By taking the shari’a implementation as the center of inquiry at this level, some 
questions can be elaborated, such as: To what extent does Islamist politics play a role in the 
enactment of sharia by-laws? To what extent does the implementation of shari’a by-laws affect 
the spirit of tolerance among the Muslims? To what extent and why does the shari’a by-laws 
affect civil liberties and human rights? In addition, it is also important to analyze how democratic 
instruments work under the implementation of shari’a. For instance, can local elections be fair 
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and free in districts with shari’a bylaws? Or can public services run fair and effective under the 
implementation of shari’a? 
In the societal level, the study will observe Muslim informal associations, more 
specifically, the trend toward religious gathering. There are two kinds of religious gatherings in 
Islamic tradition: obligatory and voluntary. However, this study only observes the Muslims’ 
voluntary gathering since it is arguably a recent popular phenomenon of Islamization in South 
Sulawesi and many other cities in Indonesia. The most prominent voluntary gathering is what so-
called pengajian
6
 or gathering for religious learning. Through this event, issues related to 
Muslim’s personal and social lives will be discussed with reference to Islamic norms and ideals. 
What is interesting from this phenomenon is, on one hand, it virtually represents the trend of 
Islamism. On the other hand, borrowing Putnam’s concept of social capital (1993), the pengajian 
also symbolizes Islamic civicness in which Muslims discuss their social issues through 
associational means. Observation in this level will seek to reveal the extent to which the 
pengajian affect religious tolerance or intolerance, and at the same time, the extent to which the 
pengajian functions as a democratic media of social capital. Questions at this level could be, but 
not limited to: Does the pengajian invoke intolerant sentiments, either against non-Muslims or 
against other Muslim group? Are there fundamentalist elements spread through pengajian?  
In the individual level, the study is intended to reveal the personal perception and 
attitudes of Muslim toward democratic ideas and practices through close observation. The key 
question at this level is; in what ways do Islamic teachings and democratic ideas interact in a 
Muslim’s daily life? The answer can be obtained by observing the extent to which religion 
                                                          
6
 The word pengajian in Bahasa Indonesia etymologically relates to verb mengaji meaning reciting the Qur’an. 
However, pengajian is not necessary conducted by reciting the Qur’an or learning how to recite the Muslim’s holy 
book, but usually by discussing broad issues in Muslim’s life based on Islamic teachings. When it is conducted on 
regular basis and in a more organized means, this kind of gathering is also known as majelis ta’lim. 
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affects her/his understanding about principle democracy, and accordingly her/his participation in 
procedural democracy. It is also important to observe her/his relation with non-Muslims, with 
other Muslim groups, and even with group of other sex, which in turn imply her/his attitudes 
toward tolerance and pluralism. 
Basically, the impact of Islamism on democracy can appear in any of the two possible 
outcomes: 
1. Islamism poses threats to democracy. 
2. Islamism provides supports to democracy. 
The assumption that Islamism produces no effects in regards to democracy is not taken as an 
option since the objective of this study is basically to examine the relationship between Islam 
and democracy, and hence the assumption will be irrelevant to the study. Although it may look 
simple at first glance as it is only indicated by two possibilities, the relationship between 
Islamism and democracy is indeed very complicated when many aspects at all levels are 
represented in variation. There is no certainty that all level of analysis will suggest one similar 
finding. Rather, it is more likely that they will appear in variation. The following table is an 
example that indicates that even when findings in each level are aggregated, the possibility of 
outcomes still varies: 
Variant of possibility 
Level of observation 
Institutional Societal Individual 
1 support support support 
2 support support threat 
3 support threat threat 
4 threat support support 
5 threat threat support 
6 support threat support 
7 threat support threat 
8 threat threat threat 
Table 2. The possible variation of research outcomes by aggregating findings in each level of 
observation . 
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Hypotheses 
The argument that is used as the main hypothesis in this study is that the relationship 
between Islamism and democracy at the local level is complex and cannot be explained by a 
simple Islam-democracy compatibility or incompatibility. Taking the variation of outcomes 
described in the table 2, this hypothesis will be supported if any one of variants 2-7 are found. If 
variant 1 or 8 is found, the relationship between Islam and democracy can be generalized and the 
hypothesis does not hold up. More specifically, variant 1 would sustain the stance of the 
compatibility school, while variant 8 would buttress the incompatibility school. 
 Any variant of data findings will in turn be analyzed further by using theoretical and 
empirical references in order to reveal the tendency of the relationship and its causal factors. For 
instance, if the data suggest variant 2 to be the case, this indicates that Islamism would go in line 
with democracy at aggregate levels, but becomes inimical to democracy when it operates on 
individual Muslim. Then the study will be directed to find explanation over this tendency. The 
opposite of this trend is that when variant 5 appear to be the case. This variant indicates Islamism 
in collective Muslims would harm democracy. 
If the variant 3 appears to be the case, this indicates that Islamist politics is more friendly 
to democracy than Islamization, and this would contradict the widely accepted assumption that 
Islamist politics is one of major obstacles for democracy in Muslim societies. In contrast, the 
case represented by the variant 4 will support the assumption that Islamist politics inherently 
poses threats to democracy. 
 Trends in the variant 6 and 7 is more complicated and would be more difficult to explain 
as Islamism at societal level is expected to go in line with any of other levels. However, these 
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variant would reveal distinctive feature of the pengajian that is different from other forms of 
Islamism. 
 
Research design 
The proposed research is a qualitative study that will involve ethnographic study during 
10 months of fieldwork in Indonesia using a combination of interviews, close observation, and 
documents. By utilizing this combined method, it is expected that comprehensive and reliable 
information can be collected and sufficiently adequate to analyze, and later to produce 
understanding about the extent of interaction between Islamism and democracy in the target 
areas. However, there will be different emphasis of method used between the institutional and 
the other two levels due to their characteristics. As the research target in institutional area will be 
local governments, the appropriate methods to employ in this area will be primarily analyzing 
documents and interviews. Documents will include  government records and  information from 
print media. Information gathered from documents will later be combined and crosschecked with 
information obtained from interviews with certain people who are either work, member, 
receiving services, or having interest in the studied institutions. The collected data will in turn be 
aggregated to figure out the extent to which the implementation of shari’a regulation affects 
democracy, either posing threats to or supporting the principle of civil liberty and religious 
tolerance. Comparative analysis will also be employed at this level. In doing so, those principles 
of democracy in shari’a districts will be measured and analyzed in comparison to the democracy 
in non-shari’a districts. 
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Levels: Methods
7
: Targets: 
Institutional Document analysis Government official records, print 
media 
In-depth Interview Islamists, nominal Muslims, non-
Muslim citizens 
Observation Islamists 
Organizational In-depth interview Islamist, common Muslims 
Participant observation Islamist, common Muslims 
Document analysis Print media 
Individual Participant observation Islamist, common Muslims 
In-depth interview Islamist, common Muslims 
Document analysis Printed media 
 
Table 3. The research methodology 
The research fieldwork is expected to be accomplished within 10 months, starting July 
2012 and ending around April 2013. Of the three levels of observations, some methods will be 
conducted simultaneously and overlapping. Therefore, the research schedule is not made based 
on the level of observations on geographical area. In this regard, the study will be conducted for 
approximately 5 months in Makassar, where most data sources locate; particularly those are in 
forms of government records and printed media. Another 5 months will be spent in three 
different districts in South Sulawesi, namely Bulukumba, Enrekang, and Soppeng. These 
districts have different significance in terms of socio-cultural characteristics. For instance, 
Bulukumba and Enrekang are both sharia districts, but Muslims in Bulukumba are 
predominantly Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) followers, while Enrekang citizens are predominantly 
                                                          
7
 Method order indicates level of priority, for instance research at institutional level will emphasize document 
analysis more than other methods, while at individual level participant observation is the most emphasized 
method. 
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Muhammadiyah Muslims. In addition, Soppeng is one South Sulawesi districts that so far do not 
implement shari’a regulations. 
In the societal and individual levels, where the research targets are basically persons, the 
data collection will be primarily conducted through in-depth interviews and close observation 
over the research subjects, while document analysis will only serve to provide secondary data 
and information. Observation in this regard is participatory observation, in which I will immerse 
myself in daily participation with the target communities. While such ethnographic technique is 
basic to anthropology, it is not widely used in political science research, more particularly in the 
scholarship of political Islam. Unlike conventional methods in political science that simply 
position researchers as outside observers in examining the research subjects or events from the 
distance by using fixed conceptual instruments, participant observation requires me to have a 
close engagement with the research subjects, and will consequently allow me to generate new 
and more comprehensive understandings about the subjects’ political perception and behavior. 
In the social level, such close observation will be employed on two pengajian groups: 
one is that operates in urban area, particularly in the city of Makassar, and the other one will be 
selected from rural areas. This is intended to reveal any link that relates Islamism with socio-
cultural factors. For instance, what are social issues that are more frequently discussed in urban 
pengajian than in rural one? In the individual level, targets of observation will be selected based 
on sex, educational level and religious affiliation. It is expected that at least 14 Muslims equally 
representing the different backgrounds will be observed during the fieldwork. These observation 
targets will also participate in in-depth interviews in order to examine their perception and 
understanding about democracy in relation with Islam. 
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In all research levels, in-depth interview will be employed and conducted without any 
specific form required. Depending on circumstances, interviews may be conducted in formal or 
informal ways, by chance or appointment, and in close-ended or open-ended discussion. For 
instance, government officials may prefer to be interviewed in formal way and by appointment, 
while ordinary people would be more comfortable with informal and by chance interview. The 
objective of this flexibility is to collect as much information as possible from the targets in any 
feasible manner. All interviews will be electronically recorded with the targets’ consent. In case 
they refuse or are not comfortable with recording, note taking will be used as an alternative 
means. For this reason, field notes will be always provided along with the electronic recording 
tool. 
At the individual level, a total of 70 persons from nominal and conservative Muslims will 
be interviewed in two target areas: 50 in the city of Makassar and 20 in the district of Enrekang. 
By this number, it is expected that at least 10 interviews can be conducted every month of 7 
months research at this level (5 months in Makassar and 2 months in Enrekang). As mentioned 
earlier, in every 5 interview targets, one of them will also be selected as a target for participant 
observation.  
RESEARCH TIMETABLE 
Time Location 
(Municipal/district): 
level of study Method Target/research subjects 
June 2012 Makassar* Pre-eliminary  research preparation** 
July – Dec. 
2012 
Makassar Institutional Document analysis - The regional archives 
office 
- The provincial government 
office 
- The municipal government 
office 
In-depth interview - Public officials 
- Citizens (Muslims & non-
Muslims) 
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Societal Participant observation 2 pengajian groups 
In-depth interview Members of the pengajian 
groups 
Individual Participant observation - 5 conservative Muslims 
- 5 nominal Muslims 
In-depth interview -  25 conservative Muslims 
- 25 nominal Muslims 
Jan. 2013 – 
Apr. 2013 
Soppeng*** Institutional Document analysis District government offices 
In-depth interview - Public officials 
- Citizens  
May 2013 – 
Sep. 2013 
Bulukumba Societal Participant observation 1 pengajian group 
In-depth interview Members of the pengajian 
group 
 
Oct. 2013 – 
Dec. 2013 
Enrekang Individual Participant observation - 2 conservative Muslims 
- 2 nominal Muslim 
In-depth interview - 10 conservative Muslims 
- 10 nominal Muslims 
*Makassar is the capital city of South Sulawesi province of Indonesia. 
**The preparation includes obtaining approvals for research from provincial/municipal/district governments of 
South Sulawesi, and identification of the research subjects. 
***Soppeng is a non-shari’a district, while Makassar, Bulukumba, and Enrekang have implemented sharia’s 
regulation. 
Table 4. Research Timetable 
 
During this ethnographic study, the data collection and analysis will be conducted 
simultaneously. This method is adopted in order to prevent information from being lost or 
forgotten before it is processed. In addition, this method also allows new lines of inquiries to 
emerge as more information and a better understanding of relevant data are acquired. Research 
memoranda will be written while listening or reviewing the recorded data, and while reflecting 
upon a particular interview or observation. All the data will be coded and entered into computer 
files that are organized based on areas and categories. 
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It is also important to note here that my cultural background provides me with advantages 
in conducting close observations in the target areas. As a native Indonesian, who is able to speak 
Bahasa Indonesia fluently, I will have no problems in communicating with the research subjects 
and, as an observer, engaging with their daily activities. I can also speak and understand Bugis 
and Makassarese, the major local languages in the region. The ability to uses local language is 
very crucial in this study as most local people of South Sulawesi communicate and more 
comfortable with their local languages despite their ability to speak Bahasa Indonesia. In 
addition, my understanding of their religious principles and tradition will also provide me the 
ability to go deeper in observing the subjects’ religious activities, such as weekly sermons and 
the pengajians in which my presence would not be seen as a violation to the norms.  
 
The Structure of the Study 
This study will be presented in a dissertation that can be divided into seven chapters. 
Chapter 1 basically consists of literature review, the purpose of the study, and research design. 
Chapter 2 deals with theoretical linkages and empirical description of Islamism in South 
Sulawesi. Chapter 3 examines the case of shari’a implementation in several districts in South 
Sulawesi, the extent of the impact of shari’a bylaws on democracy by analyzing shari’a policies, 
and by comparing shari’a district with non-shari’a district. Chapter 4 discusses the phenomenon 
of pengajian as a mode of Islamism. Chapter 5 focuses on Muslims socio-political attitudes in 
the context of Islamization and its relations with democratic principles. Chapter 6 seeks to 
analyze Islamism comparatively at the three levels, and the extent it poses impact on democracy. 
Chapter 7 concludes the study by providing explanation based on empirical and theoretical 
findings. 
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